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PANEL I (PART 1): DISCUSSION 
TRANSCRIPT 
PROFESSOR BERMAN:  Now for our final speaker on the 
panel, Professor Fanto. 
PROFESSOR FANTO:  I’m not really a speaker.  I’m just a 
commentator.  And being an organizer of the program, I’m 
acutely aware of the time.  So I want to keep the conference on 
schedule.  So I’m just going to offer a few remarks and then 
maybe a few people from the audience will and our main speak-
ers can respond to them, because I’m trying to slate a break in 
about ten minutes.  So really what I’m going to do is just offer a 
few comments on really both the papers. 
First comment would be, I think both of the speakers empha-
sized the highly contextual nature of the U.K. change.  And I 
think implicit there is the highly contextual historical nature of 
financial regulation there and here.  And I think that’s an im-
portant point.  We have to keep that in mind from a policy-
maker’s perspective, how we like the change, how much are we 
unable to change, or what are the real cultural political con-
straints inhibiting our change.  So I think both speakers em-
phasized that.  Dr. Ferran in her paper, she just mentioned it, 
but it really comes out, the [highly contextual nature]. 
Nevertheless, countries do change.  And I don't think we can 
be too sanguine about how financial regulation . . . happens to 
change.  I think from a policy point of view we have to realize 
that it’s likely not to happen due to our actions.  And I think Dr. 
Ferran makes that very clear.  It’s almost fortuitous that the 
change comes about. 
I’m kind of a partisan of more a behavioral approach, which is 
that change will happen when there’s a crisis in the system.   
Now, maybe she shares that position too. . . .  [W]hen she out-
lines the various problems with U.K. regulation that push the 
system to the point where people are willing to change , it’s the 
common behavioral position that we all know because we all 
follow it.  We don’t really move off the status quo willingly.  And 
we do it reluctantly and only when we’re forced to do so. 
So I think one of the messages that tell us — we’re not really 
policy makers, but we’re people who try to talk to policy makers, 
as Professor Jackson does — is that you try to wait for the right 
moment, and if that right moment comes upon you, you offer 
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your policies.  But those moments come.  We see it now in the 
United States with respect to corporate governance.  I mean, 
some people may disagree, well, we don’t really need to change.  
But it’s a moment when change is possible and happens. 
So that I think is one set of arguments, which is to recognize 
how you’re bound into a position.  But it doesn’t seem to me that 
that should keep you from making normative arguments.  And 
it seems to me that in the two papers I found a bit of a reluc-
tance to make a normative argument about, well, in the simple 
sense, well, what’s the best model to have.  Again, we have to be 
careful scholars and recognize that change comes about fortui-
tously.  But nonetheless one might draw some inferences from 
the data or simply stake out a theoretical position that one 
model is better than the other or that it seems more convincing. 
Now, I think that may be implicit there.  I mean, it may be 
implicit in Professor Jackson’s — I mean, he’s a careful scholar 
and if you know his work, he likes to look at a lot of data, both 
theoretical and empirical, and say, well, look, I’m going through 
these regulatory costs and I may come to some conclusions 
down the line.  But it seems to me that maybe I’d push them 
more to stake out a theoretical position.  I mean, Dr. Ferran, 
you’re very careful, but one could see one there.  One could just 
look at the U.S. system and . . . take a normative position that 
systems, despite the goals they try to accomplish, they get so 
needlessly complex that one feels that you just simply have to 
rearrange them.  And even though you recognize it, it probably 
can’t be done short of a crisis.  It seems to me that . . . implicit 
in Dr. Ferran’s talk, there’s probably a normative position that 
having multiple regulators is simply too complex. 
Now, I don't know what Howell Jackson . . . feel[s] about that, 
but maybe you’d want to talk about that.  But that’s a central 
comment — and I’m trying to keep this brief for the time — that 
I have about both papers.  So maybe in a minute you would 
want to talk about that. 
Secondly — this you both could talk about too — I think it’s 
very interesting . . . what Professor Jackson has already done in 
his other work — lay out the regulatory goals and contrast the 
regulatory goals of the two systems.  In reading through that, it 
seemed to me convincing, even though somewhat surprising.  It 
seems to me sometimes some of those goals — for example, the 
financial innovation goal [was] certainly a goal for the FSA but 
was a prominent goal for Gramm-Leach-Bliley as well. 
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So to talk about financial innovation as being peculiar to the 
U.K. — and I don’t mean to overstate your position or to push 
the position of the city — I think we could say the same thing 
here, the concern of the Congress and the federal regulators 
when they were pushing Gramm-Leach-Bliley is something of 
the same sort.  So sometimes although you could get a different 
order of priority, it may well be that all the goals really are 
there. 
The one that I found curious is this — and you might find 
that interesting, too — is . . . our emphasis on redistribution, 
consumer protection sort of thing.  When you think of Commu-
nity Reinvestment Act, you started by talking about how it’s so 
odd that those economists at Harvard lumped together the U.S. 
and the U.K., even though U.S. and U.K. are very different.  
But then — and maybe I’m stating it too strongly — then when 
you say we have this emphasis on banking regulation, on redis-
tribution and the U.K. at least doesn’t, at least not nominally, 
or less so, I don't know.  It just strikes me as curious because it 
would seem to me that on some of the data from The Economist 
they would suggest that the U.K. is a little bit more social de-
mocratic than we are.  So I’m wondering, is that kind of protec-
tion of consumers just somewhere else, maybe not in the FSA 
and its enabling regulation.  So maybe you want to talk about 
that a bit. 
The argument about cost — and I think you do it systemati-
cally Dr. Ferran, anecdotally, and you’re both doing it in a pre-
liminary way and I think that’s all we can take it [for].  I think 
you articulate elsewhere in your work, Professor Jackson, that 
it’s hard to quantify cost and so also it’s hard to quantify bene-
fits.  I mean, that’s implicit.  So I think we need the data, and 
it’s good for people to take the data but one maybe overall ques-
tion is then how do we quantify the benefits.  How do you quan-
tify a benefit such as consumer confidence or confidence in the 
financial system.  I think that’s part of what Congress has 
struggled with in the recent legislation.  So you’ve over-
regulated having CEO’s and CFO’s certify financial statements 
and do all these silly things.  But, you know, they’re struggling 
with this notion of addressing confidence in a cost-benefit, that’s 
a hard problem to deal with in a cost-benefit way. 
So those are a few brief comments.  Maybe you could talk 
about them, then we could take some questions from the floor. 
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PROFESSOR JACKSON:  Well, let me jump into the norma-
tive breach for a second.  I do have a normative angle.  But it’s 
more U.S.-oriented. 
The reason I got into this project was my sense that people 
are not aware of the costs of our regulatory structure.  And 
when an argument is made about separation of authority or 
federalist arguments . . . the costs are not always apparent.  
And I think from the United States perspective, one of the 
things that’s very interesting about this study is how much 
more we’re spending on financial services regulation than other 
countries are.  Now, maybe we want to, maybe we don’t.  But I 
think it’s very important to be explicit about what the costs are, 
and then, of course, proponents can make the case for the bene-
fits outweighing it.  But I think at least having this on the table 
— it’s not generally on the table — is valuable. 
So here the FSA and I have this sort of happy marriage.  
When they do the cost-benefit analysis, they’re looking for a 
jurisdiction that’s more costly than them that makes them look 
cost efficient.  And we are their jurisdiction.  We make them 
look good.  The Europeans don’t make them look good because 
they don’t regulate that much.  And then they’d say, well, but 
they’re not really doing it.  So they need us in their tables.  But 
I think we need them in our tables too.  Because I think a little 
bit the burden is on the American political system to explain 
why we’re spending so much more on any normalized basis, 
particularly for banking, but also for securities. 
So I do have a normative angle.  And that’s it.  I think it’s 
valuable even though it’s methodologically really complex to 
make inter-jurisdiction comparisons.  It’s also very valuable, 
and the reason I actually got into this initially, was [because] 
developing countries need to have base lines to know how much 
they should spend on regulation.  And it’s nice for them to have 
benchmarks to make some comparisons to know whether they 
are up to some sort of snuff.  Complicated to do, but valuable as 
well. 
As to the question of whether the British are more socialist 
than we are, I think this is really complex.  Go to National 
Health.  Yes, they’re more socialist than we are.  Go to banking 
regulation, we’re more socialist than they are.  You go to regula-
tion in general and I would say that we’re more intensive finan-
cial regulators than anyone else in the world, even though we’re 
common law and even though we’re the Wild West.  When you 
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actually get down to the nitty-gritty, we’re more.  You know, the 
world is more complex than my economic colleagues often rec-
ognize.  And thank goodness. 
DR. FERRAN:  On the normative agenda point, I think my 
own perspective would be that in terms of the familiar argu-
ments about the benefits of the single regulator efficiency, effec-
tiveness, accountability, I do find the arguments quite finely 
balanced.  And I do feel it’s too early to say in terms of the U.K. 
whether we have evidence to support a claim to superiority. 
What I do think, though, and I didn’t have time to develop 
this, is that in terms of European financial regulation more 
generally, there are clear advantages in individual member 
states of the European Union, simplifying and reducing the 
number of their regulatory agencies so as to facilitate more ease 
of relationships at the European level.  And I think that is an 
infinitely preferable way to develop European regulation gener-
ally as opposed to the development, say, of a Euro SEC or even 
a Euro FSA. 
PROFESSOR BERMAN:  Five minutes?  Let’s try to get a 
couple questions from the floor.  The gentlemen in the back 
there. 
QUESTION FROM AUDIENCE:  [Unintelligible]  
PROFESSOR JACKSON:  To use the framework that Dr. 
Ferran offered about the pros and cons.  If you just said a con-
solidated supervisor, if we did what the U.K. did and got an in-
stitution with roughly 50,000 employees and a budget of $4.5 
billion doing consolidated supervision in the United States, I 
personally think that would be a bad idea.  I think the problems 
of inefficiencies of scope, I think the massive political concerns 
about getting everybody in the same place would really be 
paramount.  And in that way I just think the United States sys-
tem is really quite different. 
It’s not totally clear to me whether we should be comparing 
ourselves with the U.K. or the E.U. as the right method of com-
parison.  We’re doing this country to country thing because 
that’s what we’ve traditionally done.  But in fact it’s compli-
cated.  And if you look at the E.U. you’ll see this two level sys-
tem, much lighter touch at the top, very thin in terms of per-
sonnel and strong national system.  But that is another model. 
I think that if we were going to go, if you’d ask my druthers, I 
would have more consolidation at the federal level, bringing 
some insurance stuff up.  There’s a whole bunch of things that 
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one might do.  But I have to say, the politics make me despair 
so much that I quickly move to second best, which is coordina-
tion strategies as opposed to consolidation strategies.  Which is 
what we’ve done in the SWAPS area, task forces that coordi-
nate, and other kinds of memoranda of understanding.  I think 
that’s the practical route for us in the near term. 
QUESTION FROM AUDIENCE:  Professor Jackson, one 
thing which struck me about your $4.5 billion was how little it 
is.  I mean, I assume that the people at Enron and WorldCom 
probably stole more than that [laughter] isn’t it fair to conclude 
that what we do is tiny and what France and Germany will do 
is zero. 
PROFESSOR JACKSON:  Right. 
QUESTION FROM AUDIENCE:  So why are we so concerned 
about cost.  The cost is nothing.  What’s $4.5 billion in this 
country? 
PROFESSOR JACKSON:  I like the way you think.  But 
that’s the question.  I mean, the suggestion of the data that I 
put out is that someone’s got it wrong.  France and Germany 
are the cases.  And the FSA is an intermediate case.  And I 
guess what I would say back to you is, what’s so bad about 
France and Germany?  What are we getting that they’re not 
getting?  We got Enron.  They didn’t.  So what do we buy ex-
actly – 
[CROSS-TALK] 
PROFESSOR JACKSON:  I think this is a great point to de-
bate.  But I also agree — compared to our economy, $4.5 billion 
is not what it used to be. 
QUESTION FROM AUDIENCE:  Professor Jackson, have 
you done anything to divide that $4.5 billion at the federal level 
and the state level? . . . 
PROFESSOR JACKSON:  Right.  That’s a good question.  To 
get the $4.5 billion we had to start with the states.  But I have 
not done that kind of analysis.  But what I’ve given you here is 
just a little piece of a bigger or longer term project.  That’s 
something we will definitely look at and I haven’t done yet. 
PROFESSOR BERMAN:  I think we’re going to wrap it up 
here.  The only thing I’d like to add as a final word is that the 
most recent exercise in governmental regulatory consolidation 
in the United States, the creation of the Department of Home-
land Security, has not exactly been a model of anything.  And 
gives one pause as to whether, for a variety of political and 
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structural reasons, this could be done in as coherent a fashion 
in the United States as it was done in Britain. 
